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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JON MICHAEL CADY and CAROLYN 
CADY, husband and wife, 
TELFORD REALTY COMPANY and 




RETA MAY JOHNSON and 























Case No. 18373 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - ~ - - ~ ~ - ~ - - - - -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal filed by the appellants seeking an 
order from this Court, reversing the Order of Dismissal in 
respect to the plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action and remanding 
the matter for trial on plaintiffs-appellants' Second Cause of 
Action and for a further order reversing the award-of attorney's 
fees awarded defendants-respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-appellants seek two orders. First an order 
reversing the trial court's Order of Dismissal on plaintiffs-
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appellants' Second Cause of Action. Second, an order reversing 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees and awarding the 
plaintiffs-appellants costs for the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs' 
Second Cause of Action on the basis that were not sufficient 
facts to establish a cause of action in equity or third-party 
beneficiary? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting the defendants-
respondents a judgment for attorney's fees pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-27-56? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs, Jon Michael Cady and his wife, Carolyn Cady, 
on or about July 8, ·1980 did enter into an Earnest Money Contract 
with the defendants herein. At that time it was represented that 
defendant, Jared L. Johnson, was executing the agreement for and 
on behalf of his mother. 
Pursuant to the contract, the Cadys, through their broker, 
Telford Realty Company, and the defendants, with the assistance 
of Rich Edwards of All Seasons Realty, did proceed to make 
arrangements to consummate the sale. Financing arrangements 
were made with United Savings & Loan in Bountiful. A demand was 
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made on the plaintiff Cadys to vacate the premises even at an 
earlier date than August 20, 1980, which they did in hopes of 
assisting in the closing of the sale. Final financing arrange-
ments were finally completed by the defendants and closing was 
scheduled for August 25, 1980. 
The plaintiffs all appeared at United Savings to execute 
the closing documents and disburse the funds. The defendants 
did not appear and on that date did advise the plaintiffs that 
they were not going to proceed on the contract and close. 
Subsequently, a letter dated August 25, 1980 was sent to plaintiff 
Rich Edwards indicating that the Earnest Money Offer was being 
withdrawn and a request for tender back of the earnest money 
receipt was made. Incidentally, Mr. Edwards received the letter 
more than a week after the date thereon. 
A demand for specific performance was made on the plaintiffs, 
however, it was ignored. 
Efforts were made to serve the defendants with a ten-day 
summons but were not successful. Subsequently, the Complaint was 
filed the latter part of April, 1981. Plaintiffs were finally 
served shortly thereafter. 
An Answer was filed. The matter was subsequently noticed 
up and eventually pre-tried, and set for trial on February 19, 
1982. 
The plaintiffs-appellants, upon researching certain issues 
at the time of trial did made a Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs' 
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First Cause of Action due to the fact that the case of Andreason 
v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 355 P.2d 404 (1959) was dispositive 
of the issue and the plaintiff Cadys elected to retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages. However, the matter as to 
the Second Cause of Action was then submitted to the Court on the 
basis of stipulated facts and argument for a determination by the 
Court of whether or not there were sufficient facts to establish 
a cause of action either in equity or as a third-party beneficiary 
contract. 
The Court, after some argument from both parties did dismiss 
plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action and then awarded costs and 
attorney's fees to the defendants in the sum of $1,5~2.00. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISMIS'SING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE BASIS 
THAT THE FACTS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
A CAUSE OF ACTION EITHER IN EQUTIY OR AS A THIRD-
PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT? 
The defendants-respondents did not dispute the fact of the 
Earnest Money Contract nor that both of the plaintiffs-
appellants, Telford Realty and Rich Edwards, did assist in the 
negotiations and preparations for the subsequent sale and 
financing of the sale. As indicated in the record, (TR P. 10, line 13) 
plaintiffs-appellants, Telford Realty did in the subsequent sale 
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of the home receive their share of the sales conunission and 
therefore was only out the time and efforts made in the initial 
sale. 
However, plaintiff-appellant Rich Edwards did not 
participate in the subsequent sale and as a result did lose 
his share of the real estate commission, being approximately 3% 
or $1,500.00. 
Defendants-respondents' arguments were primarily based on 
the idea that no comity existed between the defendants-
respondents and plaintiffs-appellants and furthermore that the 
defendant-respondent, Jared L. Johnson, did not have a written 
power of attorney so that he could not legitimately bind his 
mother to any contract and last, that the plaintiffs-appellants' 
Cause of Action is tied to the Earnest Money Agreement and they 
are foreclosed from any recovery due to plaintiff-appellant Cady's 
election to retain said earne~t money. 
The manifest injustice resulting from such arguments is 
readily apparent in respect to plaintiff-appellant Rich Edwards, 
for without the defendants-respondents' refusal to perform on the 
contract, Mr. Edwards would have received his commission. 
Neither he nor plaintiff-appellant Telford Realty could 
force the plaintiff-appellant Cadys to tender back the earnest 
money nor was it contemplated in the agreement that retention of 
the earnest money would be for any damages incurred by either 
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Telford Realty or Rich Edwards for defendants-respondents' 
failure to perform on the contract. Nor could plaintiffs 
Telford Realty or Rich Edwards make a claim against plaintiff 
Cadys inasmuch as they were always willing to perform pursuant 
to the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Equity dictates that where a party has been damaged, that 
they should have recourse against the party damaging them, i.e. 
the defendants-respondents, especially where that party has no 
recourse or valid claim against any other party to the 
transaction. 
In such a case the Court might limit such damages to pay-
ment for the reasonable time and expenses incurred, rather than 
the real estate commission but the trial court essentially 
held there was no cause of action and dismissed plaintiffs-
appellants' Second Cause of Action, thereby even precluding the 
plaintiffs-appellants from presenting any evidence of their claim. 
The trial court further summarily ruled that there was no 
cause of action under a theory that the plaintiff-appellant 
Telford Realty was a third-party beneficiary. The prevailing 
doctrine in the United States as set out in Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Vol. 17A P. 952 on Contracts §519(3) is that "with some qualifica-
tions, a third person.for whose benefit a contract was made may 
sue thereon, even though he is a stranger to the contract and 
the consideration therefor." 
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Two Utah cases seem very much in point. Firs·t, Walker 
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 and 
9 Utah 2d 215 where the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
"Priv~ty of contract is a prerequisite to holding 
one liable for breach of duty thereunder, but there 
are duties to others· than the immediate parties, 
where from the nature of contract, it is evident 
to promissor that the contract is for the benefit 
of third persons and that failure to discharge his 
duty would advers·ely affect them." 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court held in Continental Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Stewart, 291 P.2d 890, 4 Utah 2d 288, that a 
third person may enforce a contract made for his benefit. 
It is submitted that t~e court erred in summarily dismissing 
pl~intiffs-appellants•· Second Cause of Action without at least 
addressing the issues concerning whether or not the plaintiffs-
appellants· were donee or creditor beneficiaries pursuant to the 
case law and whether or not the cause of action was subject to 
the plaintif £-appellant Cady,. s retention of the earnest money. 
II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEYtS FEES PURSUANT 
TO U.C.A. 78-27-56. 
That particular statute enacted in 1981 which became 
effective May 12, 1981 reads as follows: 
"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by 
statute or agreement, the Court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the Cou~t 
determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought of asserted in 
good faith." 
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It is submitted that the Court committed reversible error 
in three respects: 
First, there were no Findings· of Fact by the Court in support 
of the statute that the "action was without merit and not brought 
or asserted in good faith." 
Inasmuch as the statute is only one year old, I could not 
find any Utah cases dealing with it. 
The Court, in addition to filing Supplemental Findings did 
execute the Findings and Conclusions prepared by the defendants-
respondents. The only statements pertinent to the issue is 
paragraph 5 of the Findings prepared by the defendants-respondents 
wherein it is stated "that said fees were incurred in defending 
a suit which plaintiffs .knew or should have known they could not 
win." 
The Court in its Supplemental Findings held in the third 
paragraph: 
"Pre-Trial conference was held -on November 23, 1981. 
Plaintiffs were ordered by the Court to research the 
legal effect of Plaintiffs failure to tender a refund 
of the earnest money. There was no question of fact 
as to the earnest money, that is, Plaintiffs did not 
tender the refund. Plaintiffs failed to brief this 
question of law and other questions of law relative 
to the statute of frauds. Research of the law would 
have clearly indicated to the Plaintiffs that they 
did not have a cause of action against the Defendants. 
A motion to dismiss could have then been heard without 
the necessity of trial. Counsel for the Defendants 
asked the Court to confirm the necessity of an 
appearance for trial since the legal issues were 
dispositive about one week prior to trial of the case. 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby personally contacted Plaintiffs' 
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attorney and was assured that there were trial issues 
and that trial would proceed on the date in question. 
It was not until the trial date that the Court learned 
for sure that there were no issues to try. 
The statute requires two Findings--that the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
The term "without merit" has been defined pursuant to 
Words and Phrases, VoL 46 P. 170 as meaning in a securities case, 
"a defense bordering on frivolity." In turn, a "frivilous 
pleading" as defined in Words and Phrases, Vol.17A P. 376 "is 
one so clearly untenable or the insufficiency of which is so 
manifest upon bare inspection of pleading the Court is able 
to determine its character without argument or research." 
Sherrill v. Stewart, 21 so. 2d 11, 17, 197 Miss 880 or Nolen 
v. State, 150 P. 149, 480kla594. 
The term "good faith" has numerous connotations and 
interpretations depending upon the context of its use. 
In general, it is defined in Words and Phrases, Vol. 18A 
P. 85 as follows: "The phrase 'good faith' generally imports 
that in any given case transaction involved was honestly con-
ceived and consummated without collusion, fraud, or knowledge 
of fraud, and without intent to assist in fraudulent or other-
wies unlawful design." Appel vs. Morford, 144 P.2d 95.,97, 
62 Cal.App.2d 36. 
It is s·ubmi tted that a brief review of the transcript 
clearly demonstrates that the cause of action and the pleadings 
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do not fit within the definitions prescribed by the.law and 
furthermore there was no evidence submitted to the court to 
support any such Findings and Conclusions nor did the Court 
make a Finding or Conclusion that the case was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
Second, the Complaint herein, after some difficulty in 
getting the parties served, was filed the latter part of April, 
several weeks before the applicable statute became law. Inasmuch 
as the wording of the statute refers to action without merit and 
not brought.or asserted in good faith, then a strict construction 
of the language of the statute would seem to preclude its 
.application to a case filed previous to the enactment of said 
statute, even if the Court found that the action was without 
merit and not asserted in good faith. Furthermore, in the 
subject case, the defendants-respondents neither plead the 
statute in his original Answer nor was there any allegation 
that the Complaint was without merit and riot filed or pursued in 
good faith. The only reference in the defendants' Answer was a 
prayer requesting attorney's fees and court costs. 
Third, and perhaps the most critical to this issue is that 
the judgment for attorney's fees was not based on sworn testimony. 
In Aiken v. Burrows, 514 P.2d 533, 30 Utah 2d 116 {1953) this 
Court summarily reversed an award for attorney's fees on the 
basis that such was not based upon sworn testimony. 
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The rule seems to be that any award for attorney's fees 
must be based upon evidence properly submitted to the Court 
either by stipulation of the parties, affidavit or sworn 
testimony. The reason for the rule is self-evident inasmuch as 
it becomes difficult for the Court to ascertain the reasonableness 
of the fees without having some evidence properly before the 
Court upon which to base its decision. Furthermore, opposing 
counsel should have an opportunity to at least contest and 
examine the question of the amount of the fees. 
No stipulation by the parties was filed with the Court. 
No affidavits were filed and defendant-respondent was not sworn 
nor did he give testimony under oath subject to cross examination. 
The defendant-respondent, in his argument alludes to 
attorney's fees on TR P. 7, lines 3-5. Again, on TR P. 8, lines 
1-15 wherein he indicates that he and Mr. George Handy have 
expended 24.5 hours on the case at $62.50 per hour for $1,592.50. 
Counsel further suggests that the statute (U.C.A. 78-27-56) is 
applicable but talks in terms of substantial rather than without 
merit and lack of good faith, the criteria in the statute itself. 
These are the only references in the entire file as to the 
award for attorney's fees. Again, I would submit that absent any 
stipulation of the parties, sworn testimony, or an affidavit, that 
the trial court is not in a position to award attorney's fees, 
nor was there any Findings or evidence submitted to the Court 
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upon which the Court could determine the reasonableness of those 
fees. A review of the file and transcript reveals that the 
defendants-respondents filed an Answer, wrote three letters 
and attended a pre-trial and trial, both of which combined 
lasted at the most one hour. Twenty-four and one-half hours 
would appear to be totally excessive under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that: 
1. This Court s·hould reverse the Order of Dismissal and 
remand the case back to the District Court for further hearing 
on the plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action~ 
2. Th.is Court should reverse the trial court's judgment 
for attorney•·s fees on the basis that: 
(a) The evidence was not sufficient to support 
a judg~ent for attorney~s fees, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-27-56. 
(p) That the statute should not be retroactively 
applied. 
(.c) That the judgment was not based on sworn 
testimony as is required pursuant to previous Utah State 
Supreme Court rulings, in particular, Aiken v. Burrows, 
514 P.2d 533 (.1973). 
Dated this ,z?-..~,,.- day of June, 19 8 2 . 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-13-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this af23~ day of June, 1982, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellants' 
Brief to C. DeMont Judd, Jr., Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage 
prepaid. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
